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Introduction
Gneezy, List and Wu (2006, henceforth GLW) document systematic violations of what they call the internality axiom (henceforth IA). Underlying most theories of risky choice, the IA requires that the value of any risky prospect lie between the value of that prospect's best and worst outcomes.
1 Across various valuation "goods" (gift certificates and sports cards, time preferences and work effort), elicitation modes (pricing and choice), and implementation variants (hypothetical and real-stakes, laboratory and field experiments), GLW demonstrate that people value lotteries with intermediate probability mixes less than other people value the lotteries' worst outcomes. Our results suggest that the IA violations documented by GLW are vulnerable to subject pool differences and that they can be completely undone by rewording GLW's lottery instructions.
Design and implementation
GLW's most prominent demonstration of IA violations is the valuation of gift certificates.
We focus on GLW's pricing tasks (see pp. 1286-1289) rather than their binary choice tasks (see pp. 1292-1293) because the former yield a direct valuation of the gift certificates and, ceteris paribus, supply higher statistical power for our analysis.
In the seven between-subject treatments of the hypothetical pricing task, GLW's subjects stated their willingness-to-pay for a lottery ticket granting a Barnes & Noble gift certificate worth either $50 or $100 with the following probability mixes: (1,0), (0.99,0.01), (0.6,0.4), (0.5,0.5), (0.4,0.6), (0.01,0.99) and (0,1). GLW found that the three lotteries with intermediate probability mixes were valued significantly less than the $50 gift certificate.
While the mean (median) willingness-to-pay for the $50 gift certificate was $26.1 ($25), the mean (median) willingness-to-pay for the lotteries with the probability mixes (0.6, 0.4), (0.5,0.5) and (0.4,0.6) was only $16 ($6), $16.1 ($5) and $20.8 ($10), respectively. A similarly striking IA violation was reported for the real-stakes implementation. Consider GLW's instructions for subjects in the hypothetical pricing task:
Imagine that we offer you a lottery ticket that gives you a 50 percent chance at a $50 gift certificate for Barnes and Noble, and a 50 percent chance at a $100 gift certificate for Barnes and Noble. Whichever gift certificate you win is good for use within the next two weeks. What is the highest amount of money you would be willing to pay for this lottery ticket?
We conjecture that by making the conceptual divide between the lottery ticket and the gift certificates, GLW's instructions themselves induced higher cognitive demands or perception of uncertainty or both. Hence our rewording of the instructions, though formally equivalent to GLW's instructions, avoids the lottery ticket formulation and simplifies the lottery by assigning the probabilities directly to the gift certificates' face values:
3 GLW document evidence suggesting that neither of the two characteristics can separately induce the IA violation. Indeed, GLW undo the IA violation when replicating the hypothetical pricing task with equal probabilities within subjects (see pp. 1290-91).
Imagine that we offer you a gift certificate for Barnes and Noble. With a chance of 50 percent it is a certificate worth $50, and with a chance of 50 percent it is a certificate worth $100. Whether the gift certificate is worth $50 or $100 is determined by flipping a fair coin. Whichever gift certificate you receive will be good for use within the next two weeks. What is the highest amount of money you would be willing to pay for this gift certificate?
By phrasing the lottery structure directly in terms of the gift certificates, our rewording arguably prompts subjects to value the lottery based on valuing the certificates, thus rendering the application of the IA more transparent. Accordingly, we hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, our rewording produces less violation of the IA compared to GLW's original instructions.
4
To test our hypothesis, we conduct two between-subject treatments with GLW's and our reworded lottery instructions, calling the treatments Replication and Rewording, respectively.
In either treatment, we substitute "Luxor Book Palace at Wenceslas Square" for "Barnes & Noble," and we also use local-currency gift certificates worth 500CZK and 1000CZK with local purchasing power matching GLW's.
To match GLW's sample size, we recruited thirty-two subjects for each treatmentstudents of the Institute of Economic Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. 5 Following GLW, we used a pen-and-paper design. The instructions were presented to subjects in Czech by the third author. Subjects first completed an anonymous demographic questionnaire and then received the instructions prompting them to write down their willingness-to-pay. Each subject received a show-up fee of 100 CZK (approximately $10 in purchasing power terms). 6 4 Of course, an even more transparent way to represent the lotteries would be through Venn diagrams, as is common in contemporary lottery choice research. However, our goal was to preserve the basic features of GLW's implementation and examine purely the effect of our rewording. 5 We conducted four sessions, two each for Replication and Rewording. Since another experiment following this one also featured two treatments, we guarded ourselves against potential (though unlikely) spillover effects by conducting the two experiments in a 2x2 factorial design. 6 The show-up fee is about ten times higher than the $1 fee used by GLW but our fee also applied to the follow-up experiment where the subjects earned additional $15 on average. The average total earnings were more than three times the average hourly wage in the Czech Republic. The sessions lasted about 40 minutes.
While we are well aware of potential behavioral differences between hypothetical and real-stakes implementations (e.g., Ortmann, 2001, Rydval and Ortmann, 2004) , we focus on the hypothetical pricing task for which we can provide an alternative book store that is as well-known and has similar product variety as Barnes & Noble. 7 We also conveniently circumvent the potential confounds introduced in GLW's real pricing task through their use of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) elicitation mechanism. We further note that only one out of twenty subjects in GLW's real-stakes implementation was randomly selected and paid based on his/her answer, making it a rather low-stakes implementation (in expected-value terms) resembling a hypothetical implementation. While our implementation is tightly in line with GLW's, including the purchasing power of our gift certificates, we naturally cannot rule out implementation differences stemming from experimenter effects, language effects, or subject pool differences. Among a multitude of potential reasons for the differences in WTP, our subjects might have a greater affection for reading, or fewer of them might have had trouble understanding the lottery implementation in Replication compared to GLW's Chicago students.
Results
Indeed, we find that WTP in both Replication and Rewording is significantly positively affected by subjects' year of study, while WTP is unrelated to their age and gender.
Nevertheless, we demonstrate in Table 1 that our results stand regardless of the influence of the demographic characteristics on WTP.
Our key result is the effect of our rewording on WTP. Particularly, WTP is significantly higher in Rewording than in Replication. The upward shift in WTP is so strong that the 95% confidence interval for WTP in Rewording lies completely above the face value of the 500CZK gift certificate. To the extent that transfers in cash are preferred to those in kind, our subjects would value the 500CZK gift certificate less than 500CZK. Hence our Rewording essentially eliminates the possibility of the IA violation documented by GLW. 
Discussion and conclusion
GLW show that when lotteries involve non-monetary outcomes and people are not explicitly prompted to value them based on valuing the outcomes, lotteries with equal or similar probabilities are often valued less than their worst outcomes. Our results for
Replication suggest that this IA violation is vulnerable to subject pool differences. Our results
for Rewording suggest that the IA violation can be completely undone by rewording GLW's lottery instructions in a way that arguably makes the application of the IA more transparent.
We do not dispute that GLW's lottery design may involve high cognitive demands or perception of uncertainty or both, which may trigger a valuation process incompatible with risky choice theories. After all, like GLW, we did not trace the valuation process that our subjects actually used. However, our results suggest that at least part of what GLW call the uncertainty effect might be triggered by their lottery instructions obstructing the application of the IA.
We conjecture that GLW's instructions might have been misinterpreted as describing a compound lottery featuring zero outcome(s) and uncertainty. For instance, some subjects might have misinterpreted GLW's task as featuring two lotteries with unknown probabilities:
either a (0.5, 0.5) lottery with outcomes being the $50 gift certificate and zero, or a (0.5, 0.5) lottery with outcomes being the $100 gift certificate and zero. Alternatively, some subjects might have misinterpreted GLW's task as featuring a 50% probability of winning one of the two gift certificates with unknown probabilities, and a 50% probability of receiving zero. Hastie and Dawes (2001) refer to such misinterpretations as triggering "ambiguous uncertainty." The anomalously low lottery valuation documented by GLW might therefore stem from ambiguity aversion, similarly to a common interpretation of the Ellsberg's paradox (Ellsberg, 1961) .
Our results contribute to a bigger picture that has emerged in psychology where verbally described tasks (word problems) similar to GLW's are ubiquitously used in research on probabilistic or logical reasoning. Many psychologists have emphasized that a primary source of ambiguity in word problems stems from the use of ambiguous natural language terms and experimenters' violations of conversational norms (e.g., Adler, 1991; Hilton, 1995; Evans, 2002; Schwarz, Strack, Hilton and Naderer, 1991 ; but see also Mellers, Hertwig and Kahneman, 2001) . To interpret people's behavior as violating rules of logic, probability theory or axioms of rational choice theory, the experimenter needs to assume that the word problem represents nothing more than instantiations of normative rules. However, word problems come with the semantic and pragmatic ambiguity of natural language.
Consequently, unlike experimenters who know the meaning of the key terms in logical and probabilistic word problems such as and, or, if-then and probability, experimental subjects have to infer the meaning. Crucially, natural language frequently offers multiple meanings, and to determine the intended one, people appear to use conversational maxims (i.e., Grice's 1975 Grice's , 1989 , theory of conversational reasoning, based on the premise that the communicator attempts to meet certain general standards of communication). In inferring the intended meaning of words or utterances, experimental subjects may arrive at interpretations that diverge from those of experimenters (e.g., Evans, 2002; Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999; Politzer and Noveck, 1991) . Thus experimenters, in simply equating their and subjects'
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